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I.

INTRODUCTION

In State v. Melchert-Dinkel, the “Minnesota Supreme Court held
that an individual cannot be prohibited from providing another
1
with advice or encouragement to commit suicide. Specifically, it
2
held that Minnesota’s assisted-suicide statute, which prohibits an
individual from advising, encouraging, or assisting another to
commit suicide, violated the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution because the terms “advising” and “encouraging” were
3
unconstitutionally overbroad. Yet, the court also held that the
assisted-suicide statute was constitutional, in part, because the term
“assisting” was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
4
governmental interest. The court stated that “speech alone may
also enable a person to commit suicide” and remanded the
proceeding to determine if William Francis Melchert-Dinkel’s
5
speech assisted the victims in their suicides. This note addresses
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s conclusion that speech alone can
6
rise to the level of “assistance.”
This case note begins by providing a brief history of the First
7
Amendment and constitutional restrictions on free speech. Next, it
1.
2014).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

State v. Melchert-Dinkel (Melchert-Dinkel III), 844 N.W.2d 13, 24 (Minn.
MINN. STAT. § 609.215 (2012).
Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 24.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 23, 25.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part II.A.
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discusses the history of assisted-suicide restrictions. The note then
turns to the facts of Melchert-Dinkel, as well as the Minnesota
9
Supreme Court’s decision, rationale, and outcome. Finally, this
note argues that, although the court’s application of strict scrutiny
was appropriate, an interpretation of assistance in Minnesota’s
10
assisted-suicide statute that includes pure speech
is
11
unconstitutional.
II. HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES
Over the past four hundred years, freedom of speech in the
United States has evolved. Our conceptual understanding of free
12
speech derived from England. In 1791, that concept was inscribed
13
in the First Amendment. Since then, the United States Supreme
Court has used myriad tests to interpret the text in the First
14
Amendment. In particular, the Court classifies speech based on its
15
social value and generally protects the message’s content and a
16
speaker’s viewpoint under the First Amendment. Moreover, the
Court also considers where the message is conveyed. Like any First
Amendment analysis, the Court turns to the origins of free speech
to determine if speech on the Internet should receive greater
17
protection than radio or broadcast television.
A.

Origins of Free Speech in the United States

The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law . . .
18
abridging the freedom of speech.” In particular, most speech—

8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. Throughout this note, the phrase “pure speech” is used to specify speech
or expression absent any physical action by an individual.
11. See infra Part V.B–C.
12. Michael Kahn, The Origination and Early Development of Free Speech in the
United States, 76 FLA. B.J. 71, 71 (2002).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14. See generally Joshua D. Rosenberg & Joshua P. Davis, From Four Part Tests to
First Principles: Putting Free Speech Jurisprudence into Perspective, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
833, 874–76 (2012) (discussing several doctrines and tests used to determine the
validity of statutory restrictions against the freedom of speech).
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 476 (2014).
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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artistic, social, political, and other forms, both spoken and
19
written—is afforded some level of protection. The United States
Supreme Court justifies freedom of speech by suggesting that it
20
creates a beneficial “market place of ideas.” Thus, free speech is
21
considered a useful tool in the search for truth and knowledge.
Furthermore, the Court has held that free speech fosters effective
22
participation in government. Under this view, generally referred
to as the “instrumentalist theory,” restrictions on free speech are
23
justified when society does not benefit from the restricted speech.
Alternatively, the so-called “individual autonomy theory” relies on
24
the idea of basic human rights and dignity to justify free speech.
This theory generally argues for greater free speech protections,
but supports restrictions on speech against “outright lies and

19. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (“At the heart
of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for
himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and
adherence.”); see also Thea E. Potanos, Dueling Values: The Clash of Cyber Suicide
Speech and the First Amendment, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 679 (2012).
20. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 56 (1953) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); see Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982) (stating that the
First Amendment’s role is to foster individual self-expression and provide “‘public
access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas’”
(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978))); Citizens
Against Rent Control/Coal. for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295
(1981) (“The Court has long viewed the First Amendment as protecting a
marketplace for the clash of different views and conflicting ideas.”); see also Stanley
Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 2, 2–3 (1984).
21. Ingber, supra note 20, at 3. To review the first known discussion of a
“marketplace of ideas,” see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas . . . accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”).
22. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (“The protection
given speech . . . was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.”); Stromberg
v. People of Cal., 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (discussing the usefulness of “free
political discussion” in asserting the will of the people such that government may
respond).
23. Ingber, supra note 20, at 4–5. See generally Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech
Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 121 (1989) (analogizing instrumental views as
consequential).
24. See Bruce E.H. Johnson & Kyu Ho Youm, Commercial Speech and Free
Expression: The United States and Europe Compared, 2 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 159, 169
(2009) (citing THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 4, 5 (1966)). See generally Greenawalt, supra note 23.
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subliminal manipulation,” because they may endanger autonomous
25
choice.
In practice, the instrumentalist and individual autonomy
theories both support the concept that some speech may be
26
restricted. Yet, the Court found the instrumentalist theory more
compelling and held that speech of “slight social value” may fall
27
into a category less protected by the First Amendment.
Many less-protected classifications of speech are relevant to
assisted suicide, and each classification is afforded a low level of
28
scrutiny. Alternatively, where a prohibition on speech restricts the
content of a message, the Court applies a much higher level of
29
scrutiny.
1.

Less-Protected Classifications

Since the instrumentalist theory’s adoption, the United States
Supreme Court has determined that several classifications of
30
These less-protected
speech are of “slight social value.”
classifications of speech include speech integral to criminal
31
32
conduct, speech that incites imminent lawless action, and
33
fraudulent speech. Historically, the Court has been forced to
balance the freedom of speech against certain dangers inherent in
34
speech associated with lawlessness. In the 1949 case of Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co., the Court created a new, less-protected
classification of speech for the purposes of the First Amendment—
35
speech integral to criminal conduct.
At issue in Giboney was an injunction that prohibited a local
union from picketing to compel a distributor to sign an agreement
25. Greenawalt, supra note 23, at 150–52 (“Of course, every government
prohibition of action interferes with free choice, and therefore with the exercise of
autonomy.”).
26. See generally Ingber, supra note 20; Potanos, supra note 19.
27. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
28. See infra Part II.A.1.
29. See infra Part II.A.2.
30. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
31. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2539 (2012); Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949).
32. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969).
33. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544.
34. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 548–49 (1951) (reasoning that a
state may protect itself from violent overthrow).
35. 336 U.S. at 498.
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36

that would violate Missouri antitrust laws. On appeal, the local
union argued that prohibiting their picketing violated the First
37
Amendment. This was the United States Supreme Court’s first
opportunity to address whether the First Amendment should
38
protect speech integral to the violation of a criminal statute.
Ultimately, the Court held that the “constitutional freedom for
speech [does not] extend [protection] to speech or writing used as
39
an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.”
Twenty years later, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court
established another classification of less-protected speech—
40
incitement. Speech constitutes incitement when it advocates
“imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
41
action.” In Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan leader was convicted
42
under a criminal syndicalism statute for advocating violence per
the Klan’s missions and assembling “with a group formed to teach
43
or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.” Although the
Court recognized this additional less-protected class of incitement
speech, it nevertheless found the statute unconstitutionally
44
overbroad. The Court held that incitement implies more
provocation to action than mere advocacy, and because Ohio’s
statute prohibited advocacy, in addition to incitement, it went too
45
far.
Forty-three years later, in United States v. Alvarez, a new, less46
protected speech classification was created. Specifically, Alvarez
held that the government may prohibit fraudulent speech when
the speaker, by his or her speech, intends to “gain a material
36. Id. at 491–92.
37. Brief for Appellants at 12, Giboney, 336 U.S. 490 (No. 182), 1948 WL
47306, at *17.
38. Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498–501.
39. Id. at 498. For historical background, see Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88 (1940) and Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940), which discuss the
limitations of a state’s power to impair free speech.
40. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
41. Id.
42. The term “criminal syndicalism” is defined as “[a]ny doctrine that
advocates or teaches the use of illegal methods to change industrial or political
control.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1679 (10th ed. 2014).
43. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444–48 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(discussing the Ku Klux Klan leader’s hateful remarks made at a televised rally).
44. Id. at 449.
45. Id.
46. 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
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advantage” or affect “other valuable considerations.” In this case,
an individual fraudulently represented himself as a Congressional
48
Medal of Honor recipient. The United States Supreme Court held
49
that the Stolen Valor Act, which prohibited individuals from
fraudulently representing themselves as recipients of military
50
medals, was unconstitutional. The Court declared that fraudulent
speech was another classification with less protection under the
51
First Amendment. However, it reasoned that the Stolen Valor Act
was unconstitutional because the state could “achieve its legitimate
52
objectives in less restrictive ways.”
Generally, however, restrictions on any of these less-protected
classifications—speech that is integral to criminal conduct, incites
imminent lawless action, or is fraudulent—are found constitutional
because they are subjected to less scrutiny than other types of
53
54
speech. This includes content-based restrictions, which are
discussed next.

47. Id. at 2547–48. The United States Supreme Court does not define “other
valuable considerations” in Alvarez, but in previous decisions, it found that false
statements are offered less protection under the First Amendment when they are
related to situations that discuss defamation or some other legally cognizable
harm. See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60–61 (1982) (“[F]alsehoods are not
protected by the First Amendment in the same manner as truthful statements.”);
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771 (1976) (“Untruthful speech . . . has never been protected for its own sake.”).
48. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2542.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2005).
50. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2556.
51. Id. at 2545.
52. Id. at 2551 (Breyer, J., concurring).
53. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 15 (1973) (holding that a
statute’s restrictions were constitutional because obscene materials were not
protected by the First Amendment).
54. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002)
(holding that a statute prohibiting speech based on its content was subject to strict
scrutiny); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 207 (1992) (applying strict scrutiny
where a statute prohibited certain types of speech); Barry P. McDonald, Speech and
Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1348 (2006). See generally 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§ 827 (2014) (analyzing the level of scrutiny required for content-based
restrictions).
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Content-Based Restrictions

Content-based restrictions prohibit a particular message,
55
subject, or viewpoint conveyed within speech. The United States
Supreme Court requires a high level of scrutiny for content-based
restrictions because the Court acknowledges the potential risks of
56
limiting a speaker’s message. Society has a vested interest in
57
permitting a “market place of ideas.” Thus, without a high level of
scrutiny for content-based restrictions, the government could
prohibit “disfavored ideas or views from [entering] the marketplace
58
[of ideas].”
When restricted speech does not fall into a less-protected
classification, the Court has consistently held that the speech is
59
afforded total protection under the First Amendment.
Consequently, a statute that restricts speech based on its content
60
must pass a strict level of scrutiny to be deemed constitutional. To
pass strict scrutiny, a compelling governmental interest must exist
and the statute must be narrowly tailored to serve that compelling
61
interest. A statute is narrowly tailored if a compelling interest is
62
actually served and there are no less restrictive alternatives. For
example, in Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, the Court
held that a statute denying adult access to telephone messages,
indecent in nature, was unconstitutional because there was a less
55. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 47
(1987); see also Ofer Raban, Content-Based, Secondary Effects, and Expressive Conduct:
What in the World Do They Mean (and What Do They Mean to the United States Supreme
Court)?, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 551, 555 (2000) (describing content-based
restrictions as restrictions on speech based on “substance or . . . subject matter”).
56. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (holding that
content-based regulations are “presumptively invalid”); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (reasoning
that restrictions on content-based speech can “drive certain ideas or viewpoints
from the marketplace”); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448–49 (1991)
(acknowledging that content-based restrictions distort the marketplace of ideas).
57. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
58. Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. FCC, 729 F.3d 137, 158 (2d Cir. 2013).
59. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 812 (2000)
(“Laws designed or intended to suppress or restrict the expression of specific
speakers contradict basic First Amendment principles.”); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (“Government action that stifles speech on
account of its message . . . contravenes [the First Amendment].”).
60. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 207 (1992).
61. Id. at 199.
62. See, e.g., Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. at 804.
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63

rights-restrictive alternative. Conversely, in State v. Crawley, the
Minnesota Supreme Court found that a statute criminalizing false
reports of police misconduct was constitutional because there was
no less restrictive means of achieving the compelling governmental
64
interest.
B.

The Internet and the First Amendment

Because an analysis on free speech restrictions depends on
where the message is conveyed, and broadcast media falls under
65
the protection of the First Amendment, a historical look at other
forms of broadcast media is highly relevant. The validity of a
restriction depends, in part, on the applicable platform—radio,
broadcast television, or the Internet.
The Internet is arguably “‘the most participatory marketplace
of mass speech that this country—and indeed the world—has yet
66
seen.’” In the United States Supreme Court’s first Internet-related
First Amendment case, it analogized the Internet with other forms
67
of broadcast media. Historically, restrictions on broadcast media
68
were analyzed under an intermediate level of scrutiny.
In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, a statute prohibiting
“indecent and patently offensive communications” on the Internet
69
was constitutionally challenged. Although the State asserted a
compelling governmental interest, the Court found that less

63. 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989).
64. 819 N.W.2d 94, 107 (Minn. 2012) (holding that the statute could be
narrowly construed to reach only defamatory statements).
65. See Regulation of Broadcast Speech, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 148, 148 (1978).
66. Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1115, 1119 (2005) (quoting ACLU v. Reno (Reno I), 929 F. Supp. 824,
881 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)).
67. Reno v. ACLU (Reno II), 521 U.S. 844, 845 (1997); Potanos, supra note
19, at 682.
68. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 758–59 (1978)
(distinguishing broadcast radio from other forms of media by stating that the
broadcast audience includes both willing adults and unsupervised children, and
pointing out that broadcasting penetrates into the home, a place that should
remain free from uninvited sights and sounds). For a summary of the intermediate
scrutiny analysis, see Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“To withstand
intermediate scrutiny, a statutory classification must be substantially related to an
important governmental objective.” (emphasis added)).
69. Reno II, 521 U.S. at 849 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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restrictive means to achieve the State’s interest were available.
Notably, in its analysis, the Court reasoned that cyberspace was
distinguishable from broadcast media and held that strict scrutiny
was appropriate for content-based speech restrictions on the
71
Internet. Specifically, it held that cyberspace is not invasive;
rather, individuals seek the content displayed on the Internet, as
opposed to broadcast media, where viewers have little control over
72
the content to which they are exposed. Moreover, the Court was
concerned with the chilling effect this particular restriction would
73
have on free speech. Consequently, the Court held that the
statute was unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it
74
failed strict scrutiny.
In Reno, the statute’s chilling effect was measured against two
other cases. In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, the Court found a
judicial rule unconstitutional under the void for vagueness doctrine
because the rule failed to provide “fair notice to those to whom [it
75
was] directed.” In Dombrowski v. Pfister, the Court held that the
deterrent effect was increased when prohibited by a criminal
76
statute. Reliance on these two cases, and the outcome in Reno,
emphasize the Court’s desire to prevent the chilling effects
associated with speech restrictions in cyberspace, even when such
77
restrictions are aimed at limiting harmful speech.

70. Id. at 877 (citing Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 842) (agreeing with the district
court that content-blocking software was “a reasonably effective” substitute and a
less restrictive method of achieving the State’s compelling interest).
71. Id. at 868 (arguing that factors present in other media discussions—
“scarcity of available frequencies” and “invasive nature”—are missing in the
context of cyberpace (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637–38
(1994) and Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989))).
72. Id. at 869; see also Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet
as an Unintermediated Experience, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 697, 703–04 (2010)
(discussing the various intermediaries employed to protect users from unwanted
content, including firewalls and other filtering, anti-virus, and malware software).
73. Reno II, 521 U.S. at 871–72 (holding that the vagueness of this statute
created an “obvious chilling effect”).
74. Id. at 846 (arguing that the suppression of “a large amount of speech”
constitutes significant overbreadth of the challenged statute).
75. 501 U.S. 1030, 1048 (1991) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 112 (1972)).
76. 380 U.S. 470, 499 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (asserting that the
Court’s “major premise” was “that criminal enforcement of an overly broad statute
affecting rights of speech . . . is in itself a deterrent to the free exercise thereof”).
77. Reno II, 521 U.S. at 846; see Todd A. Nist, Finding the Right Approach: A
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III. HISTORY OF ASSISTED SUICIDE IN THE UNITED STATES AND
MINNESOTA
For over seven hundred years, Anglo-American law has
consistently punished an individual for assisting another in
78
committing suicide. Since the decriminalization of suicide, the
United States Supreme Court has decided two significant cases
79
questioning the constitutionality of barring assisted suicide.
In 1997, in Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court considered
whether a statute prohibiting physician-assisted suicide was
80
constitutional under the Due Process Clause. The Court weighed
81
history, tradition, and current practices as significant factors.
Ultimately, the Glucksberg Court held that assisting another in
committing suicide was not a fundamental right; thus, it found the
82
statute constitutional.
In the same year as the Glucksberg decision, the Court
determined the constitutionality of another assisted-suicide statute
83
in Vacco v. Quill. In this case, a group of physicians brought a
lawsuit against the State of New York, arguing that a statute
criminalizing the assistance of suicide was unconstitutional under
84
the Equal Protection Clause. Although the physicians argued that
refusal of life-sustaining treatment was no different than physicianConstitutional Alternative for Shielding Kids from Harmful Materials Online, 65 OHIO ST.
L.J. 451, 461–67 (2004) (discussing the negative effects of allowing harmful speech
on the Internet).
78. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 702 (1997).
79. Potanos, supra note 19, at 677.
80. 521 U.S. at 702.
81. Id. at 710–19. Common law history shows that harsh penalties were
imposed on the estate of individuals who committed suicide. Id. at 712–13. Later,
the common law approach was abandoned as states enacted laws criminalizing one
person for assisting another in committing suicide. Id. at 713–15.
82. 521 U.S. at 728. Some liberties are deemed fundamental because they are
so “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); see also Ginsberg v. State of New York,
390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (concluding that a right was fundamental because it was
“basic in the structure of our society”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496
(1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (concluding that a right “as fundamental as our
entire civilization” should maintain some protection, even if the U.S. Constitution
does not expressly provide it). These fundamental rights are “protected by the
Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution].”
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728.
83. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
84. Id. at 797–98.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015

11

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 14

2015]

409

STATE V. MELCHERT-DINKEL
85

assisted suicide, the United States Supreme Court disagreed. The
Vacco Court reasoned that a distinction exists between assisting
another in committing suicide and letting another die through
refusal of medical care—a distinction sufficient to confirm the
86
constitutionality of the statute under the Equal Protection Clause.
While the Court, in distinguishing the two, focused on the actor’s
intent, its reasoning also concluded that some action or inaction
87
was required to violate the assisted-suicide statute.
IV. THE MELCHERT-DINKEL DECISION AND OUTCOME
A.

Facts

Two individuals, Mark Drybrough and Nadia Kajouji,
committed suicide after communicating over the Internet with
88
William Francis Melchert-Dinkel. In both cases, Melchert-Dinkel
responded to the victims in an online forum and encouraged their
89
suicidal thoughts. Additionally, he attempted to watch the victims
90
commit suicide “via webcam.” The State charged Melchert-Dinkel
91
with two counts of aiding suicide. He was convicted on both
92
counts at trial, and the conviction was affirmed by the Minnesota
93
Court of Appeals.

85. Id. at 798–99.
86. Id. at 793–94 (reasoning that this distinction agrees with principles of
causation and intent); see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
279–80 (1990) (discussing the right to refuse lifesaving treatment).
87. Vacco, 521 U.S. at 802 (noting that a physician assisting a patient to
commit suicide and a physician letting a patient die may have the same result);
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 734 (defining euthanasia as the “deliberate termination of
another’s life at his request”).
88. Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Minn. 2014).
89. Id. at 16–17.
90. Id. at 16.
91. Appellant’s Brief, Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d 13 (No. A11-0987), 2012
WL 10756771, at *2.
92. State v. Melchert-Dinkel (Melchert-Dinkel I), No. 66-CR-10-1193, 2011 WL
893506, at *19 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 15, 2011).
93. State v. Melchert-Dinkel (Melchert-Dinkel II), 816 N.W.2d 703, 705 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2012), rev’d, 844 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 2014).
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Mark Drybrough

On or around July 27, 2005, Mark Drybrough committed
94
suicide by hanging. Melchert-Dinkel initially contacted Drybrough
in an online forum after Drybrough posted a question about
committing suicide by hanging without a high point to tie his
95
rope. Melchert-Dinkel, posing as a female emergency room nurse,
answered Drybrough’s post by e-mail, suggesting that he could
96
hang himself using a doorknob. Additionally, Melchert-Dinkel
assured Drybrough of this method’s effectiveness, falsely boasting
that he “trialed it . . . with very good results” and that he also
97
planned on hanging himself. Closing his initial e-mail, MelchertDinkel pressed Drybrough to reply with any additional questions,
98
promising that he would respond quickly.
In subsequent e-mails, Drybrough disclosed to Melchert-Dinkel
that he suffered from mental-health issues and a condition with
99
“chronic flu-like symptoms.” When Drybrough later inquired
about committing suicide by overdosing on easily obtainable drugs,
Melchert-Dinkel discouraged this method and again urged that
100
Drybrough hang himself. Moreover, Melchert-Dinkel created a
false sense of urgency in Drybrough’s suicide by stating, “I want to
[die] very badly and plan to soon but [I] will stay here for you as
101
long as possible.”
Throughout their communications, Drybrough indicated that
102
He also told
he had “hope[d] that things might change.”
103
Melchert-Dinkel that he was grappling between life and suicide.
In Drybrough’s last e-mail, he told Melchert-Dinkel that he was not

94. Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 17.
95. Id. at 16.
96. Melchert-Dinkel II, 816 N.W.2d at 706. Drybrough considered this
information to be “instructions,” and he passed the explanation along to another
inquirer. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 707.
100. Id. at 706.
101. Respondent’s Brief at 34, Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 2014)
(No. A11-0987), 2012 WL 10756772, at *34.
102. Id. at 7.
103. Melchert-Dinkel II, 816 N.W.2d at 706–07.
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104

suicidal. Yet, he followed Melchert-Dinkel’s advice; he hung a
105
noose, put it around his neck, and killed himself.
2.

Nadia Kajouji

On March 1, 2008, Nadia Kajouji posted a message on a
106
suicide website stating that she suffered from severe depression.
107
Her post asked for advice on quick and reliable suicide methods.
In Melchert-Dinkel’s first e-mail to Kajouji, he again falsely
represented himself as a female emergency room nurse suffering
from severe depression and expressed a desire to commit suicide
108
soon. In the course of their first conversation, Melchert-Dinkel
advocated for self-hanging and proposed that they commit suicide
109
together. Kajouji declined and, instead, stated her desire to jump
from a bridge because she wanted her suicide to look like an
110
accident.
In his second e-mail, Melchert-Dinkel repeatedly
advised Kajouji to commit suicide by hanging and suggested that
111
they both commit suicide that night. In their last online chat,
Kajouji confidently claimed that she would commit suicide in a few
112
113
hours. Her body was found in a river six weeks later.
After Kajouji’s death, law enforcement discovered her e-mails
114
to Melchert-Dinkel. Concerned that Melchert-Dinkel was also
104. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 101, at 7. Four days after Drybrough’s
final e-mail, Drybrough’s sister found him hanging from a loft ladder leaning up
against a wall. Id.
105. Melchert-Dinkel I, No. 66-CR-10-1193, 2011 WL 893506, at *9–10 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. Mar. 15, 2011).
106. Melchert-Dinkel II, 816 N.W.2d at 708.
107. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 101, at 8; see also Melchert-Dinkel I, 2011 WL
893506, at *11 (“I have lived with severe depression . . . and it only worsens as I
seek treatment and help. I have not attempted suicide in the past. . . . I just want a
quick out.”).
108. Melchert-Dinkel II, 816 N.W.2d at 708.
109. Id.; see also Melchert-Dinkel I, 2011 WL 893506, at *11–16 (“[I]f you wanted
to do hanging we could have done it together on line so it would not have been so
scary for you. . . . I can help you with it with the [web] cam.”).
110. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 101, at 8.
111. Id. at 10–11, 34 (“I wish [w]e [b]oth could die now while we are quietly
in o[u]r homes ton[ight].”).
112. Id. at 11; Melchert-Dinkel I, 2011 WL 893506, at *16. Kajouji was never seen
after she e-mailed her roommate to inform her that she was going skating—the
same night as Kajouji’s final conversation with Melchert-Dinkel. Id. at *17.
113. Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d 13, 17 (Minn. 2014).
114. Melchert-Dinkel I, 2011 WL 893506, at *17.
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suicidal, the Faribault police traced his e-mail address and
115
contacted the Mankato Police Department. At first, MelchertDinkel blamed his daughters for the e-mails; however, he eventually
116
admitted to sending the communications himself. Consequently,
he was charged “with two counts of advising and encouraging
117
suicide.” The prosecution did not accuse Melchert-Dinkel of
assisting in the suicides, nor was “assist” included in the charges
118
against him.
B.

Procedural Posture Before the Minnesota Supreme Court

At a bench trial, the State presented evidence that MelchertDinkel falsely posed as a female registered nurse and falsely
discussed his own desire to commit suicide in his communications
with the victims. The State showed that Melchert-Dinkel’s
communications took the form of coaching—urging the victims to
119
write with any questions, promising that he would reply quickly.
The State also introduced evidence that Melchert-Dinkel provided
Drybrough with step-by-step instructions on how to commit suicide
120
by hanging. The State’s evidence indicated that both victims
believed that Melchert-Dinkel’s advice was both practical and
121
sympathetic.
After closing arguments, the district court found Melchert122
Dinkel guilty of advising and encouraging suicide. Furthermore,
the district court dismissed Melchert-Dinkel’s argument that the
assisted-suicide statute was unconstitutional on its face because his
123
speech was protected by the First Amendment. Melchert-Dinkel
appealed the district court’s decision, maintaining that Minnesota’s
124
assisted-suicide statute violated his First Amendment rights.

115. Id.
116. Melchert-Dinkel II, 816 N.W.2d 703, 711 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012), rev’d, 844
N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 2014). In addition, Melchert-Dinkel admitted to asking fifteen
to twenty people to commit suicide and requesting a webcam to capture the event.
Id. at 712.
117. Id.
118. Id.; see also Melchert-Dinkel I, 2011 WL 893506, at *29.
119. Melchert-Dinkel II, 816 N.W.2d at 705.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 707–11.
122. Id. at 712.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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Today, aiding another in committing suicide remains a
125
criminal offense in many states. However, some state statutes have
moved away from prohibitions on “encouraging” or “advising”
126
another to commit suicide. Prior to Melchert-Dinkel, the case that is
the topic of this note, Minnesota prohibited “intentionally
advis[ing], encourag[ing], or assist[ing] another in taking the
127
other’s own life.” Currently, Minnesota prohibits an individual
128
from intentionally assisting another in taking the other’s life.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals recently reviewed two cases—
Melchert-Dinkel included—addressing assisted suicide. In MelchertDinkel, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that Minnesota’s
129
assisted-suicide statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad.
After the Minnesota Supreme Court granted review of Melchert130
Dinkel, the Minnesota Court of Appeals had an opportunity to
reconsider its decision in another assisted-suicide case, State v. Final
131
Exit Network, Inc. Here, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed

125. See generally Justine R. Young, Dead Wrong: The Problems with Assisted Suicide
Statutes and Prosecutions, 6 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 123 (1994) (comparing assistedsuicide statutes in the twenty-nine states that had them).
126. This author researched assisted-suicide statutes throughout the United
States. Many statutes still include the terms “advise” and “encourage”; however,
several states have modified their assisted-suicide statutes to indicate requirements
of intent and causation in assisting another to commit suicide. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. ANN. § 11.41.120 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. Sess.) (“A person
commits . . . manslaughter . . . [when he or she] intentionally aids another person
to commit suicide.”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d
Extraordinary Sess.) (“A person commits manslaughter . . . [when he or she]
purposely causes or aids another person to commit suicide.”); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-54a (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.) (“A person is guilty of
murder when . . . he causes . . . a suicide by force, duress, or deception.”); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-2 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. Sess. and 2d Tech.
Sess. of the 118th Gen. Assemb.) (“A person who intentionally causes another
human being, by force, duress, or deception, to commit suicide commits causing
suicide. . . .”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West, Westlaw through 2014
Reg. Sess.) (“A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he or she
knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide.”).
127. MINN. STAT. § 609.215, subdiv. 1 (2012), invalidated in part by MelchertDinkel III, 844 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 2014).
128. See Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 18.
129. Melchert-Dinkel II, 816 N.W.2d at 705, 713–17, 720 (finding that the statute
was narrowly tailored to serve the State’s compelling interest, even if MelchertDinkel’s speech was protected by the First Amendment).
130. See id.
131. State v. Final Exit Network, Inc., Nos. A13-0563, -0564, -0565, 2013 WL
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its previous decision, holding that the prohibition on encouraging
132
or advising another to commit suicide was unconstitutional.
Unlike its previous decision in Melchert-Dinkel, the Minnesota Court
of Appeals applied strict scrutiny and held that Minnesota’s
assisted-suicide statute failed because the language was broad and
there was no causal connection between the prohibition and the
133
state’s interest in preserving human life. The Minnesota Supreme
Court had its first opportunity to apply a First Amendment
argument to Minnesota’s assisted-suicide statute in Melchert-Dinkel.
C.

The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision

Before the Minnesota Supreme Court, Melchert-Dinkel again
claimed that his interactions with Drybrough and Kajouji
“represented constitutionally-protected speech pursuant to the
134
First Amendment.” However, the State argued that Minnesota’s
assisted-suicide statute could restrict Melchert-Dinkel’s speech
because it fell into one of three less-protected exceptions to the
135
First Amendment. Even if an exception did not apply, the State
claimed that Minnesota’s assisted-suicide statute was narrowly
tailored to serve the State’s compelling governmental interest in
136
preserving human life.
1.

Majority Opinion

The majority disagreed with the State’s argument that
Melchert-Dinkel’s speech fell into the less-protected criminal
conduct or incitement exceptions because the conduct
137
advocated—suicide—did not violate any existing criminal statute.
Similarly, it disagreed with the State’s argument that the statute fell

5418170 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2013), rev. granted, (Minn. Dec. 17, 2013), rev.
denied, (Minn. June 17, 2014), stay vacated, (Minn. June 17, 2014).
132. Id. at *7.
133. Id. at *5–6.
134. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 91, at *2.
135. Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d 13, 19 (Minn. 2014) (arguing that
Melchert-Dinkel’s speech was integral to criminal conduct, likely produced
imminent lawless action, and provided false statements amounting to fraud).
136. Id. at 18.
137. Id. at 19–21. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the argument
regarding speech integral to criminal conduct was circular, and that an individual
cannot be punished for inciting an action that is not illegal. Id. at 20.
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under the less-protected fraud exception to the First
138
Amendment.
Instead, the court held that a strict level of scrutiny was
139
required because the restriction was content-based. First, the
court recognized the State’s interest in preserving human life as
140
compelling. Next, it reasoned that prohibiting the assistance,
advisement, or encouragement of suicide could be necessary to
achieve the State’s compelling governmental interest in preserving
141
human life, per Glucksberg. Finally, it analyzed each term of the
statute for its common and ordinary meaning to determine
142
whether the statute was narrowly tailored.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the statute’s
restriction against assisting another to commit suicide was narrowly
tailored because a direct, causal link could be drawn between the
prohibition and the State’s interest in preserving human life. The
court also found that speech alone may constitute assistance that
143
enables a person to commit suicide. Additionally, the court held
that the terms “advise” and “encourage” indicated no direct, causal
144
connection to committing suicide. Consequently, those terms
within the statute violated the First Amendment, and they were
145
resultantly severed from Minnesota’s assisted-suicide statute.

138. Id. at 21. While the Minnesota Supreme Court found Melchert-Dinkel’s
actions to be deceitful, it was not convinced that his actions were an attempt at
gaining some “material advantage or valuable consideration.” Id.
139. Id. at 18 (“[T]he government ‘has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.’” (quoting Police
Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972))).
140. Id. at 22 (citing Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kan. City v. Ashcroft, 462
U.S. 476, 485 (1983)).
141. Id. (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997))
(reasoning that a statement made by the United States Supreme Court in
Glucksberg, under a rational basis review, was sufficient to continue the Court’s
analysis under strict scrutiny).
142. Id. at 22–24.
143. Id. at 23 (“While enablement perhaps most obviously occurs in the
context of physical assistance, speech alone may also enable a person to commit suicide.”
(emphasis added)).
144. Id. at 23–24 (“[A] prohibition on advising or encouraging includes
speech that is more tangential to the act of suicide.”); Id. at 24 (reasoning that the
State’s compelling interest, preserving human life, did not mean that the State had
a compelling interest to restrict speech that advised or encouraged suicide).
145. Id. at 15–16.
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Justice Page’s Dissent: Only Restricting Physical Actions that
Assist Suicide

Justice Page agreed with the majority’s holding that barring
speech
that
“advises”
or
“encourages”
suicide
was
146
unconstitutional. However, he disagreed with the court’s remand
to determine whether Melchert-Dinkel’s speech assisted the victims
147
in taking their lives.
He argued that there was insufficient
evidence to prove that Melchert-Dinkel assisted the two suicides
under the dictionary definition of “assist” because there was no
148
physical action. Justice Page pointed out that the majority’s
failure to use the “dictionary definition of the word ‘assist’ [wa]s
149
telling.” Furthermore, he claimed that the State failed to charge
Melchert-Dinkel with assisting suicide—the prosecution’s argument
focused on whether Melchert-Dinkel advised or encouraged
150
suicide. Finally, Justice Page pointed out that, when MelchertDinkel was convicted, the district court judge intentionally left out
151
the term “assist” from its finding. He argued that this omission
was deliberate; thus, remanding the case to determine whether
152
Melchert-Dinkel assisted in the suicides was not appropriate.
D.

Remand Proceedings Following the Minnesota Supreme Court Decision

On September 8, 2014, Melchert-Dinkel appeared in Rice
County District Court once more to determine whether his speech
assisted Drybrough or Kajouji in their suicides; he was convicted of
assisting Drybrough in committing suicide and attempting to assist
153
Kajouji in committing suicide. Here, the district court defined
“assist” as “speech or conduct that provides another person with
154
what is needed . . . to commit suicide.” Additionally, the district
146. Id. at 25 (Page, J., dissenting).
147. Id. (arguing, among other things, that there was insufficient proof to
demonstrate that Melchert-Dinkel assisted the victims in committing their
suicides).
148. Id. at 26. Justice Page, using the same dictionary as the majority,
emphasized that the definition of “assist” requires some act. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 26–27.
151. Id. at 25.
152. Id. at 27–28.
153. State of Minnesota v. William Francis Melchert-Dinkel (Melchert-Dinkel
IV), 66-CR-10-1193, Sept. 8, 2014, at *1–2.
154. Id. at *9.
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court focused on whether a “direct and causal connection” existed,
and whether Melchert-Dinkel “intended to provide instructive
155
suicide methods.”
To convict Melchert-Dinkel of assisting Drybrough in
committing suicide, the district court focused on several e-mails
156
where he stated his desire to “help” Drybrough commit suicide.
Moreover, it reasoned that Melchert-Dinkel’s e-mails were “step-bystep instructions” that Drybrough sought, and Drybrough followed
157
these instructions when he committed suicide.
Although Kajouji also committed suicide, the court reasoned
that Melchert-Dinkel did not assist in her suicide because she used
158
a method different from Melchert-Dinkel’s instructions.
Nonetheless, the district court held that Melchert-Dinkel
committed the lesser offense of attempting to assist suicide because
he intended to assist in her suicide, and he “did an act that was a
159
substantial step toward . . . assisting suicide.”
Melchert-Dinkel will likely appeal these convictions, arguing
160
that he did not assist in Drybrough’s suicide. Moreover, his
attorney stated that a different defense would have been used
161
under the new assisted-suicide statute.
V. ANALYSIS
This note agrees with, and expands on, Justice Page’s dissent.
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision to apply a strict
level of scrutiny in this case was correct, it mistakenly concluded
that Melchert-Dinkel could assist in the victims’ suicide through

155. Id.
156. Id. at *6–7.
157. Id.
158. Id. at *10.
159. Id. at *11–12 (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.17 (2012)).
160. Importantly, Melchert-Dinkel instructed Drybrough on how he could
hang himself from a door knob. Melchert-Dinkel I, No. 66-CR-10-1193, 2011 WL
893506, at *5–6 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 15, 2011). Since significant weight was
placed on Melchert-Dinkel’s specific instructions, and Drybrough did not commit
suicide in the manner instructed by Melchert-Dinkel, a direct, causal relationship
may not exist. See Melchert-Dinkel IV, 66-CR-10-1193, at *5; Melchert-Dinkel I, 2011 WL
893506, at *10.
161. Former Nurse Guilty of Assisting Suicide to be Sentenced, HUFFINGTON POST
(Oct. 16, 2014, 4:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/15/former
-nurse-assisted-sui_n_5988730.html.
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162

speech alone. Additionally, this note analyzes whether the court
properly balanced the competing interests at issue.
A.

Less-Protected Classifications of Internet Speech: Harmful or Illegal
Conduct?

Although less-protected classifications of speech have been
established, the United States Supreme Court maintains a
163
protective stance over the First Amendment. Due to the delicate
164
nature of expressive conduct on the Internet, the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s reluctance to expand on the exceptions to
165
protected speech in Giboney and Brandenburg was appropriate.
1.

The Giboney Exception: Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct

Correct application of the holding in Giboney requires a
166
distinction between harmful conduct and illegal conduct. In
Giboney, the Court concluded that speech can be restricted when it
167
constitutes “a single and integrated course of [illegal] conduct.”
The Court’s reasoning focused on the appellant’s violation of a
168
statute, not on any specific harmful action. Similarly, in New York
v. Ferber, the Court held that the sale of child pornography was “an
169
integral part of the [illegal] production of such materials.”
Traditionally, the United States Supreme Court has used a
balancing test to determine whether a First Amendment restriction

162. Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d 13, 25 (Minn. 2014).
163. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (“[A]uthors
of the First Amendment knew that . . . unconventional ideas might disturb the
complacent, but they . . . believed [it] essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever
to triumph over slothful ignorance.”).
164. See generally Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, First Amendment Protection
Afforded to Web Site Operators, 30 A.L.R. 6th 299 (2008) (summarizing First
Amendment protections on the Internet).
165. Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 19–20.
166. Id. at 20 (arguing that the inclusion of harmful speech in the phrase
“speech integral to criminal conduct” expands the exception beyond the United
States Supreme Court’s guidance).
167. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949).
168. Id.
169. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982). Although the majority
considered the direct harm suffered by the child, the United States Supreme
Court held that the promotion of such performances was “intrinsically related to
. . . sexual abuse of children.” Id.
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is justified. Restricting speech that is integral to illegal conduct is
clearly justified by a State’s compelling governmental interest in
171
preventing criminal activity. Yet, expanding a category of speech
172
to harmful conduct may unreasonably broaden the category. For
example, some harm may arise out of actions independent of any
173
intended message. Furthermore, some harmful speech may be
174
justifiably protected by the First Amendment.
The situation becomes more complex when dealing with
harmful speech on the Internet. The Internet permits individuals
to remain anonymous when stating their opinions and ideas,
175
however distasteful or harmful the speech may be to others.
Accordingly, speech is likely to be more harmful on the Internet,
since individuals are not held accountable for their anonymous
176
conduct. Moreover, restricting harmful speech in this context
may have a significant chilling effect, and the United States
Supreme Court has consistently held statutes unconstitutional “to
177
avoid any chilling effect caused by an improper interpretation.”
The Internet consists of an infinite number of mediums
178
through which individuals can communicate. Since the Internet
is a popular forum in which to exchange ideas, the Minnesota
170. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 779
(2001).
171. Id.; see also Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498.
172. See Matthew C. Ruedy, Repercussions of A Myspace Teen Suicide: Should AntiCyberbullying Laws Be Created?, 9 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 323, 343 (2008) (arguing that an
individual may be harmed even though, under an objective standard, a reasonable
person would not foresee any harm).
173. See, e.g., Appellant’s Brief, supra note 91, at *43–44 (arguing that
Melchert-Dinkel’s actions were independent of the victims’ decisions to commit
suicide); see also Rubenfeld, supra note 170, at 777.
174. See, e.g., Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 215–17 (3d Cir.
2001) (holding that a restriction against any “unwelcome verbal, written or
physical conduct which offends . . . an individual” is unconstitutional, even though
the state asserted a harm caused by the speech).
175. See Sarah Jameson, Cyberharassment: Striking a Balance Between Free Speech
and Privacy, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 231, 238–39 (2008).
176. Id. at 239.
177. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 311 (2010); see
also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 630 (1973); 281 Care Comm. v.
Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 629 (8th Cir. 2011). See generally Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech
Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects of the DMCA on the First
Amendment, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 171 (2010) (discussing the chilling effects
doctrine recognized by the United States Supreme Court).
178. See Reno II, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997).
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Supreme Court correctly held that the Giboney exception should
not be expanded to include harmful speech.
2.

The Brandenburg Test: Speech that Incites Imminent
Lawlessness

In Melchert-Dinkel, the State attempted to draw the court’s
179
attention to the interpretation of “imminent.” It correctly held
180
that the Brandenburg exception only applied to unlawful actions.
Similar to Giboney, it is clear that the court was not willing to
expand the Brandenburg exception to include both illegal and
181
harmful speech. Instead, it maintained that the application of
Brandenburg must be rigorously adhered to in the interest of
182
protecting the First Amendment.
B.

Is There a Compelling Interest to Prohibit Legal Acts?

To pass strict scrutiny, the government must first assert an
183
interest that the court finds compelling. In Melchert-Dinkel, the
Minnesota Supreme Court found, based on precedent, that the
184
State’s asserted interest in preserving human life was compelling.
Yet, public policy and opinion on assisted suicide may be
185
changing. Moreover, the government should not prohibit an
individual from assisting in a legal act.
Compelling governmental interests have no textual support in
186
the U.S. Constitution. Consequently, the United States Supreme
Court has found compelling governmental interests on the basis of
187
several different considerations.
Specifically, governmental
interests may be held compelling based upon public policy or “the
179. See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 101, at 33–37.
180. See Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d 13, 20–21 (Minn. 2014) (citing
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
181. Id. at 19–21.
182. See id. at 20–21.
183. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992).
184. Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 22 n.4.
185. See Dennis Thompson, Did Brittany Maynard Change Minds About Right-toDie Laws?, CBSNEWS (Dec. 5, 2014, 11:59 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com
/news/brittany-maynard-poll-right-to-die-laws; see also infra notes 191–95 and
accompanying text.
186. Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 919 (1988).
187. See id.
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188

realization of constitutional guarantees.” In Melchert-Dinkel, the
Minnesota Supreme Court relied on public health and policy
concerns addressed in an amicus brief that was filed by the
189
National Alliance on Mental Illness of Minnesota.
Although public policy arguments have historically favored
rules that restrict an individual from assisting another in
190
191
committing suicide, recent events may be changing this view. In
fact, several other states have altered their assisted-suicide statutes
192
to permit physician-assisted suicides. Polls have shown general
193
approval for physician-aided end-of-life decisions. Yet, when the
194
term “suicide” is used, the general approval rating drops. This
suggests that the term “suicide” itself still carries a negative
195
connotation. If general approval of assisted suicide continues,
courts may be forced to reassess whether a compelling
governmental interest exists based on public policy. Melchert-Dinkel
holds that the government’s interest in prohibiting a legal act—
196
suicide—is compelling. Yet, courts should not prohibit actions
that assist in what is legal.
While a compelling governmental interest was found in
197
Melchert-Dinkel, public policy seems to be changing,
and
188. Id. at 935–37.
189. Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 22 n.4.
190. See Melchert-Dinkel II, 816 N.W.2d 703, 713–14 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012),
rev’d, 844 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 2014) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
711–12 (1997)).
191. See generally Cyndi Bollman, A Dignified Death? Don't Forget About the
Physically Disabled and Those Not Terminally Ill: An Analysis of Physician-Assisted Suicide
Laws, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 395 (2010); Neil M. Gorsuch, The Right to Assisted Suicide and
Euthanasia, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 600 (2000).
192. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.800 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg.
Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5281–5292 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Gen.
Assemb.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.245.010–.904 (West, Westlaw through 2014
legislation); Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1215 (Mont. 2009).
193. Lydia Saad, U.S. Support for Euthanasia Hinges on How It’s Described,
GALLUP POL. (May 29, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162815/support
-euthanasia-hinges-described.aspx.
194. Id. (stating that the approval number is still above average when the term
“suicide” is used).
195. Id.
196. See Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d 13, 22 (Minn. 2014).
197. Strong Public Support for Right to Die, PEW RES. CENTER FOR PEOPLE & PRESS
(Jan. 5, 2006), http://www.people-press.org/2006/01/05/strong-public-support
-for-right-to-die/ (“A solid majority of Americans (60%) believe a person has a
moral right to end their life if they are suffering great pain and have no hope of
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preserving human life in the face of suicide may no longer be a
compelling interest. Moreover, no legislature should be allowed to
prohibit the assistance of legal acts.
C.

Melchert-Dinkel’s Outcome: Unconstitutional Restriction on Speech
in Minnesota’s Assisted-Suicide Statute

The Minnesota Supreme Court held that assisting another in
committing suicide can be prohibited because the term “assist”
indicates a “direct, causal link” between the suicidal person and the
198
person assisting in the suicide. The prohibition against assisted
suicide is constitutional because the court found that the statute
199
was narrowly tailored. This conclusion was proper, until the court
200
stated that pure speech may assist another in committing suicide.
Minnesota’s assisted-suicide statute does not define the term
201
“assist,” and the plain-meaning interpretation adopted by the
court is inappropriate because assistance requires some physical
202
action. Minnesota’s assisted-suicide statute is analogous to its
aiding and abetting statute, which requires some type of action
203
beyond pure speech. By expanding the definition of “assist” to
include pure speech, the Minnesota Supreme Court broadened the
statute’s reach, thereby chilling speech that may also be properly
defined as mere encouragement or advice. Whereas MelchertDinkel’s
speech—encouraging
and
advising
suicide—is
constitutionally protected, it may still be restricted under the
majority’s overly broad definition of the term “assist.”
1.

Pure Speech and the Term “Assist”

In his dissent, Justice Page asserts that some action, other than
speech, must be performed for an individual to truly assist another
204
This assertion not only matches the
in committing suicide.

improvement.”).
198. Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 23 (“[S]tatutory limitation that . . . must
be targeted at a specific individual, narrows the reach to . . . direct, causal links.”).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 25–26 (Page, J., dissenting).
201. See MINN. STAT. § 609.215 (2012).
202. Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 26.
203. See MINN. STAT. §§ 609.05, 609.215.
204. Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 26.
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205

dictionary definition of “assist,” but it also ensures that the statute
206
is narrowly tailored.
In addition, Justice Page’s assertion furthers Minnesota’s
207
principles of statutory interpretation.
In Melchert-Dinkel, the
Minnesota Supreme Court defined the term “assist” as “provid[ing]
208
(a person, etc.) with what is needed for a purpose.” However, this
209
definition stems from the verb “help,” not “assist.” The court
seemingly decided that the terms “assist” and “help” were
synonymous, even though the text of the statute does not mention
210
the word “help.”
Moreover, the court further altered the
definition of the term “assist” to include pure speech that
211
“enable[s] a person to commit suicide.” The same dictionary
212
used by the majority defines “assist” as the “act of helping.” This
common definition of the term “assist” requires action beyond
speaking; therefore, precluding pure speech contradicts the true
213
definition of “assist.”
Relying on the majority’s definition not only defies the
dictionary definition of “assist,” but it also contradicts statutory
214
interpretation. The United States Supreme Court has consistently
held that a statute “should be construed [such that] . . . no part will
215
be inoperative or superfluous.” The Minnesota Supreme Court
has similarly established that statutes must be “construed . . . so that
216
no word . . . is superfluous, void, or insignificant.”

205. Id. (stating that “assist” is defined as the “act of helping” (quoting THE
NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 132 (4th ed. 1993))).
206. See infra Part V.C.3.
207. See Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. 1999); State v. Suess,
236 Minn. 174, 182, 52 N.W.2d 409, 415 (1952).
208. Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 23 (majority opinion). Importantly, the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s definition of the term “assist” was limited to the
context of Minnesota’s assisted-suicide statute. Id.
209. Id. Justice Page points out that the majority’s “avoidance of the dictionary
definition of the word ‘assist’ is telling.” Id. at 26 (Page, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 26.
211. Id. at 23 (majority opinion).
212. Id. at 26 (Page, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 304 (2009); Hibbs v. Winn, 542
U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (quoting 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (6th ed. 2000)).
216. Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. 1999).
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Under the Minnesota Supreme Court’s definition, “assist” is
217
superfluous because it is given the same meaning as the terms
218
“encourage” or “advise.” In Melchert-Dinkel, the court stated that
the terms “advise,” “encourage,” and “assist” all fell under its broad
definition for “aid,” a term the court uses interchangeably with
219
“assist.” If the court had included an action more concrete than
pure speech in its definition of “assist,” the term would not be
superfluous. By omitting an action requirement from its definition,
220
a defendant’s words alone could assist another to commit suicide.
Melchert-Dinkel’s instructions “encouraged” and “advised” others
221
to commit suicide. That his words may also “assist” suicide
supports the argument that the term “assist” is superfluous under
the majority’s definition.
2.

California’s Solution: Comparing Assisted Suicide to Aiding and
Abetting

The California Supreme Court has interpreted its assistedsuicide statute as prohibiting the “aiding and abetting of a specific
222
In particular, it has envisioned some level of
suicidal act.”
physical participation by an individual that enables another to
223
224
commit suicide. The court has interpreted the statute in this
way because the assisted suicide language bears a close resemblance
to the aiding and abetting language found elsewhere in California’s
225
penal code. In addition, the terms “aiding” and “abetting” have

217. Id. Under principles of statutory construction, a term is superfluous or
insignificant if it is unnecessary or redundant. Id. (arguing that a redundant
phrase in the language of a statute would be superfluous).
218. Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 23 (majority opinion) (defining the
verb “advise” as to inform and the verb “encourage” as to give courage,
confidence, or hope) (citation omitted).
219. Id. at 25 n.7.
220. Id. at 25 (concluding that Melchert-Dinkel’s speech could have assisted
Drybrough and Kajouji in committing suicide).
221. See Melchert-Dinkel II, 816 N.W.2d 703, 706, 712 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012).
222. McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 197 (Ct. App. 1988).
223. People v. Matlock, 336 P.2d 505, 511 (Cal. 1959) (holding that a person
who “furnish[es] the means for bringing about death . . . for the use of the [other]
person who himself commits . . . self murder” may be convicted of assisting
suicide).
224. CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.).
225. In re Ryan N., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 632 (Ct. App. 2001).
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been used interchangeably with the terms in its assisted-suicide
226
statute.
An analogy can be drawn between California’s and
Minnesota’s assisted-suicide and aiding and abetting statutes,
because each state’s respective statute closely resembles the
227
other. Minnesota’s aiding and abetting statute reads, “A person is
criminally liable for a crime . . . if the person intentionally aids [or]
228
advises . . . the other to commit the crime.” Although this
language is strikingly similar to the Minnesota’s assisted-suicide
statute, the supreme court has interpreted each statute’s text very
229
differently. While the statutes’ terms “aid” and “assist” differ, the
Minnesota Supreme Court previously stated that “aid” is a term
“broad enough to encompass advice, encourage[ment], and
230
assist[ance].” If the supreme court interpreted its assisted-suicide
statute as aiding and abetting a suicidal act, it too would require
some physical action or further participation on the part of a
231
defendant. In aiding and abetting cases, the Minnesota Supreme
Court requires that the “defendant intended his presence or actions
232
to further [the] commission of [a] crime.”
Thus, while
Minnesota’s assisted-suicide and aiding and abetting statutes are
nearly identical in language, the court has given their terms
significantly different meanings.
Like California, the Minnesota Supreme Court should adopt
the previously established meaning of Minnesota’s aiding and
226. Id. at 632 n.5 (discussing the similarities between statutes utilizing the
terms advised, encouraged, aiding, and abetting).
227. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 (“All persons concerned in the
commission of a crime, whether . . . they . . . aid and abet in its commission, or,
not being present, have advised and encouraged its commission . . . .”), and id.
§ 401 (“Every person who deliberately aids, advises, or encourages . . . .”), with
MINN. STAT. § 609.215 (2012) (“Whoever intentionally advises, encourages, or
assists . . . may be sentenced . . . .”), and id. § 609.05 (1991) (“A person is
criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the person intentionally aids,
advises . . . the other to commit the crime.”).
228. MINN. STAT. § 609.05, subdiv. 1.
229. See Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d 13, 23 (Minn. 2014) (including pure
speech within its definition of the term “assist”); State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789,
805 (Minn. 2012) (defining the term “aid,” in part, as a defendant’s “presence or
actions to further the commission of [a] crime” (citing State v. Mahkuk, 736
N.W.2d 675, 682 (Minn. 2007))).
230. Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 25 n.7.
231. See Milton, 821 N.W.2d at 789.
232. Id. at 805 (emphasis added) (citing Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d at 682).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss1/14

28

Schoeberl: Constitutional Law: How Minnesota Unconstitutionally Broadened It

426

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1

abetting statute because the language is strikingly similar to
233
Minnesota’s assisted-suicide statute. If the Minnesota Supreme
Court interpreted assisted suicide similarly to California, assisted
suicide would require something more than pure speech.
3.

Distinguishing Between the Terms “Assist,” “Advise,” and
“Encourage”

The Minnesota Supreme Court sent mixed signals with its
holding in Melchert-Dinkel. Clearly, the terms “encourage” and
234
“advise” were unconstitutionally overbroad. Even though the
court limited the assisted-suicide statute’s prohibition to “assist,”
including pure speech within its definition unconstitutionally
235
broadened the statute’s reach.
Moreover, the term “assist”
becomes arguably indistinguishable from the terms “encourage”
and “advise” when its definition includes pure speech.
Justice Page asserted that without some action “more concrete
than speech instructing another on suicide methods,” publication
of books that describe “successful suicide behavior” could be
236
restricted. The majority justified its inclusion of pure speech by
stating that a “direct, causal link between speech and the suicide”
237
existed. Yet, Justice Page’s book example also suggests a direct,
causal link to suicide. The book may not target a specific individual,
but it targets a vulnerable group of people contemplating suicide.
Here, a direct, causal link would exist if an individual committed
suicide using information obtained from a book that outlined
methods of committing suicide.
The majority also reasoned that, unlike the term “assist,”
238
nothing in the definitions for the terms “advise” or “encourage”
239
required “a direct, causal connection to a suicide.” Yet, each term
may directly cause suicide. For example, in 1992, a television
233. See MINN. STAT. § 609.215 (2012); MINN. STAT. § 609.05 (1991).
234. Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 25 (Page, J., dissenting).
235. A statute is unconstitutionally broad when it “deters the exercise of First
Amendment rights by unnecessarily punishing constitutionally protected along
with unprotected activity.” In re S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d 412, 417 (Minn. 1978); see also
Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118–19 (2003); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402
U.S. 611, 614 (1971).
236. Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 26.
237. Id. at 23 (majority opinion).
238. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
239. Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 23.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015

29

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 14

2015]

STATE V. MELCHERT-DINKEL

427

station aired a movie that was based on a true story of a person who
“aided her mother in committing suicide” with advice from a
240
physician and a book that outlined suicide methods. Under the
majority’s definition of “assist,” the physician, the person who aided
her mother, and the author who outlined suicide methods could
be charged under the assisted-suicide statute because pure
speech—whether it encourages, advises, or assists—can enable an
241
Indeed, even the television
individual to commit suicide.
company could be charged with assisting another in committing
suicide if someone committed suicide after watching the movie.
The majority’s interpretation of “assist” should include some
242
action beyond pure speech.
Alternatively, the Minnesota
Supreme Court should interpret Minnesota’s assisted-suicide
243
statute as aiding and abetting suicide. Regardless, the terms
“encourage,” “advise,” and “assist” are indistinguishable when the
244
definition of “assist” includes pure speech. An interpretation of
“assist” that includes pure speech unconstitutionally broadens the
language of the assisted-suicide statute in a First Amendment
245
context.
D.

Melchert-Dinkel’s Impact and an Alternative Holding

The Minnesota Supreme Court did not apply the lessprotected exceptions to the First Amendment found in Giboney,
246
Brandenburg, and Alvarez in Melchert-Dinkel. Furthermore, it is clear
that the court was unwilling to expand less-protected classifications
247
of speech to include harmful speech. In the context of assisted
suicide, the court determined that some speech may still be subject
248
to restrictions further limiting First Amendment protections. Yet,
the decision in Melchert-Dinkel severed the terms “advises” and
249
“encourages” from Minnesota’s assisted-suicide statute.

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Young, supra note 125, at 124 n.7.
Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 23.
Id. at 26 (Page, J., dissenting).
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 91, at *35–37.
Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 26.
See id.
See id. at 19–21 (majority opinion).
Id.
See id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
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The Melchert-Dinkel decision leads to several unanswered
questions. What constitutes providing another with what is needed
250
to commit suicide?
Does giving another person step-by-step
instructions on committing suicide by hanging constitute
251
assistance? Is the statute really narrowly tailored such that it
satisfies strict scrutiny? Unfortunately, the Minnesota Supreme
Court did not elaborate on its classification of assisted-suicide
speech, other than suggesting that Melchert-Dinkel’s speech could
252
constitute assistance.
Courts cannot change or alter the text of a statute. However,
the legislature may and should look to assisted-suicide statutes in
other states as examples. Many states require action beyond pure
speech in their assisted-suicide statutes, explicitly providing that
253
some physical act is also required. By stating that assisted suicide
requires a physical act, courts remove the need to apply strict
scrutiny because a fundamental right—speech—is not affected.
The Minnesota Supreme Court should have followed the
reasoning in Justice Page’s dissent. Specifically, the holding should
not have included pure speech in its definition of the term “assist,”
and the terms “encourage” and “advise” should have been
254
severed. This alternative ensures that the assisted-suicide statute is
narrowly tailored to effect the compelling governmental interest of
255
preserving human life. Moreover, requiring something more
250. See id. at 23 (“Consistent with the plain language of the statute, we
therefore conclude that the ‘assist[]’ prohibition . . . proscribes speech or conduct
that provides another person with what is needed for the person to commit
suicide.”).
251. See Melchert-Dinkel I, No. 66-CR-10-1193, 2011 WL 893506, at *6 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. Mar. 15, 2011) (detailing e-mails in which Melchert-Dinkel wrote to
Drybrough and explained in great detail how to commit suicide via suspension
hanging). For a discussion on the Rice County District Court’s conclusion, see
supra notes 153–61 and accompanying text.
252. Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 25.
253. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg.
Sess. and 2d Spec. Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-5 (West, Westlaw through 2014
Reg. Sess.); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4017 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg.
Sess.); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-34.5 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg.
Sess.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707A.2 (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5407 (West, Westlaw
through 2014 Reg. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216.302 (West, Westlaw through
2014 legislation); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-102 (West, Westlaw through 2014
Reg. Sess.).
254. Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 25–26 (Page, J., dissenting).
255. See id. at 26.
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than pure speech eliminates any concern over the chilling effect
associated with speech that may assist another in committing
suicide. Finally, the assisted-suicide statute should not be
256
interpreted such that any term is superfluous. Since MelchertDinkel did not perform any action beyond pure speech in the
furtherance of the victims’ suicides, his conviction under the
assisted-suicide statute should have been reversed and the charges
257
vacated.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly held that the
standard of review for this First Amendment issue was strict
scrutiny. The court’s refusal to apply any of the less-protected
exceptions to Melchert-Dinkel’s speech implies that the First
258
Amendment continues to protect harmful speech. While the
court found the State’s interest in preserving human life
compelling, such an interest may not be compelling in the context
of assisted suicide. In addition, the court restricted pure speech
259
that assists another in committing suicide.
Presented with a difficult question, the Minnesota Supreme
Court determined that an individual could not be criminally
260
charged for encouraging or advising another to commit suicide.
However, it upheld the restriction against assisting another in
261
committing suicide. Moreover, the court found a restriction
against pure speech that may assist another in committing suicide
262
constitutional.
The court’s reliance on a direct, causal link
inherent in the term “assist,” not present in either the term
“encourage” or “advise,” led to its conclusion that the restriction
263
was narrowly tailored. However, including pure speech in its
definition of the term “assist” unconstitutionally broadened the
264
assisted-suicide statute.

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

See Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. 1999).
Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 25.
See id. at 20–21 (majority opinion).
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id.
See id. at 26 (Page, J., dissenting).
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Instead, the Minnesota Supreme Court should have required
some action more concrete than speech alone to define the term
265
“assist.” In doing so, it would have met the dictionary definition
266
of “assist.” Furthermore, requiring physical action would have
aligned the court’s interpretation of Minnesota’s assisted-suicide
267
statute with its aiding and abetting statute, while also ensuring
268
that the statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad. Allowing a
restriction on speech that assists another in committing suicide
leaves the door open for further misinterpretations of, and
unconstitutional restrictions on, the First Amendment freedom of
speech.

265.
266.
267.
268.

Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 26.
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 91, at *14, 44.
See Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 26.
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